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IN THE UTAH COURT Ol APPLALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : i n II I0bb8-LA 
v. : 
" arity No. 2 
CHARLES DAVID WRIGHT, 
A i gu i iinii Requested 
Defe : 
BRIEF OF APPEL1 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
E '">s - - : . - j 
possession of an ir v ice a third degree telon> in vnnation ol I tah v ode Ann §§ 
7 
entered in the Third Judicial District Couri, tah, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, presiding \ <„* Cv.u.i i.ai, a,
 t-..^x j^.^.cuon undei Uliili 
Code Ann. § 78 ?a V?)(f) <\ii|i|i \WH). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
May a trial court reconsider an orally-announced but unwritten criminal 
with the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment for the same offense? 
This question entails questions of rule, statute, and const; 
in this case, to nondeferential appellate review of the 
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part, 
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb . . .." Utah's statutory double jeopardy provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) 
(1995), similarly states, "No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense[.]" 
Accord UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 12. Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and rules 
54, 58A, and 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are copied in the appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wright was charged with possession of an incendiary device, a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995) (formerly "infernal machine," Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-10-306 through -308 (1990)) (R. 8-9). Through plea bargaining, he pleaded 
guilty to attempted possession of an incendiary device, a third degree felony by operation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(3) (1995). After orally announcing that Wright would be placed 
on probation (R. 77-79), the trial court reconsidered, and sentenced him to zero-to-five years 
at the Utah State Prison-die allowable term for a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203(3) (1995) (R. 38-39, 94). Wright appeals that stricter sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the underlying crime are gleaned from the charging information 
and from statements at the several trial court hearings in this case. Wright and a friend 
2 
exploded a home-made pipe bomr d 
neighbors called the police, precipitatinr Wnvht's arres* *—
 r . .^:u?H> 
The facts critical to ci:*> *t| |-^at .•!»* t,iit process' 
tin; challenged WTO In five-years prison sentence for his "little fire works" (R. 77). When 
Wright pleaded guilty, on 23 May 1994, to attempted possession of an incendiary device, he 
admowledged die tiii.il MMIII J aniiitf lli.il In inulil urrivr ii .'cio-to-fivf vear prison 
sentence, even if the State recommended leniency (R. 01 (\J\ I'he trial court, then -. •- -J -
presentence report from th Il k'partmeni nl Aulm (KIN MI 
sentencing for 20 June VJ i i i" 32, 63-6:5) :1 
However, A 1 0L 1", i intended 
t •« : ** l* )Ih(T charges. Thereiuic, A T . &, I . had not prepared a presentence 
repo -i a *ntencing hearing (R. 33, 6 ^ Based upon that 
developing :•<* entencing to 
11 July 1994 (with an alternative 01 August date? The court also suggested that defense 
counsel might then persuade tin torn! to seiilcnu '^»ij»i»l li,|||l i" 'H m "" ' » |«u^niienie 
report (R. 33, 70). 
On 11 July 1994, Wright appeared for sentencing, although the. presentence 
i /|i it ''till h M1 > of been completed (R. 73). The trial court t ^ w ^ e d concern 
of a presentence report; how i, irleuse counsel urged the court to senteiv hout 
llir ir| if 1,11"" ' \ "Mil Tllllif; p m s m i t o i agreed that Wr igh t could be pid^cu uu ^ l u u a u u u \AX. 
l rThe trial cour t had some information about W r i g h t ' s cr iminal h is tory , but desired m o r e 
complete information; the court therefore requested a presentence report. (R. 63-64) 
3 
75-77). Accordingly, the trial court announced that it would suspend Wright's prison term 
for the pleaded-to crime, and impose thirty-six months of probation, to include a twelve 
month jail sentence plus payment of a fine, surcharge, and possible restitution. Jail release 
would be possible upon subsequent confirmation that Wright was employed (R. 77-79). 
That orally-announced sentence was never reduced to writing. Instead, on 18 
July 1994—one week after its oral announcement of probation-the trial court convened 
another brief hearing (R. 97-103). The court explained that because it had not received the 
presentence report before the 11 July hearing, it had not signed the commitment order 
placing Wright on probation: 
As I proceeded with sentencing last week, I misunderstood that 
there was in fact a presentence report on the way. And in fact, if you 
recall, I was a bit in wonderment of why I only had effectively a 
statement of the criminal history of the defendant, rather than a 
complete presentence report. 
It was only after the entire calendar that Mr. Wilson indicated to 
me that there was a presentence report being prepared, and it just 
wasn't completed. Because I was informed of that, I did not sign the 
judgment. And as far as I'm concerned there is no judgment, there is 
no sentence until I sign those papers. 
The oral hearing and the court's statement at oral hearing is the 
statement of what the court intends to do upon the preparation of the 
papers. I now revoke what I intended to do, and we'll have a new 
sentencing hearing based on this presentence report that has now been 
completed and submitted to me today. 
(R. 98-99). The trial court therefore continued sentencing to 01 August 1994 (R. 101). 
On 01 August, Wright did not appear in court due to an apparent scheduling 
glitch with jail transportation officers. However, through counsel, Wright proffered mental 
4 
health information that he believed pertinent to sentencing (R I i ,''n ^-i Jiii^l), Hit trial 
court again continued sentencing, to 29 August 1994 (R. l w / . 
At the 29 August hearing, Wright argued, through counsel, that the earlier, 
orally iiiimnumeri sen*""*' "l| " '"^iine imii dui ilmtble jeopardy , ' M process princip'es 
barred the court from irruv^ i a stricter sentence than it had iiiiiiiiii iiiiiiii Il < III"1" I I ' " II II l T h e 
trial court rejected "thai aigui .. * HI OI,:UIIS Imulh allri I  ilii lllllli ii 
orally, then I sign the papers. e not signed any papers" tk y-2 i reviewed 
the confusion and delay n, c . ~ me presentence rej ..-.;..„ 
its original oral sentence amirun^uivai, in order to sentence W right with the aid -A A 
complete presentence report (R. 84-86). 
The tii ial court then i e view ed th t pi esentence report with Wright, and with an 
A.P. A I\ representative, giving attention to Wright's mental health history as therein 
reportet - .^cliut; *im i1 Il1" 'i II"" ir.commnululiiiii nl nail Iiiiiiiiii inn I Imdmp no 
treatment facility available to address Wright's uncertain mental health needs, the trial 
sentenced him to zero-to-five years at the state prison (K JK, lil Wi Hu aubt "V'V'i ij In luul 
remained in jail since the initial oral sentence announcement, the court credited that jail time 
against his prison sentence (R. 94-95). This sentence was reduced to writing, signed and 
filed I "i ' "ii" i1 "i ' 'ii ^mimics his double jeopardy-based challenge to the zero-
to-fi
 m irs prison sentence. 
The trial court's ruling that no sentence was imposed by its initial, oral 
sentencing announcement is correct undei Utah I m I 'asc law and Hit III ah uniaxial and 
5 
civil procedure rules hold that no sentence or judgment exists until it is signed and entered by 
the court. Contrary federal authority addresses due process concerns that are not present in 
this case. Because no sentence was imposed by the trial court's initial, oral announcement, 
there was no double jeopardy bar to the court's subsequent decision, duly signed and entered, 
to sentence Wright to a prison term. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
PROBATION HAD NO LEGAL EFFECT UNDER UTAH LAW, 
THERE WAS NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY BAR TO WRIGHT'S 
SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN PRISON SENTENCE 
Wright correctly states that constitutional and statutory double jeopardy 
principles bar "multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 717 (1969); State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989); see U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; UTAH CONST, art. I § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(a) (1995). He argues that 
the trial court punished him twice for attempted possession of an incendiary device, violating 
double jeopardy, by first orally stating that probation would be granted, but then 
subsequently committing him to prison. 
Wright's argument depends upon his premise that the trial court's initial oral 
announcement that he would receive probation, never reduced to writing, constituted 
"punishment" (E.g., Br. of Appellant at 8 ("the court lawfully imposed sentence;" id. at 13-
14 (oral statement about probation was a "lawful sentence")). As the trial court correctly 
held (R. 82), that premise is false. 
Under Utah law, there is no sentence, and hence no "punishment," until a 
criminal judgment is entered in writing. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
6 
19'8l final court's oral statement Qui ninety day piesenlcnu' « VJ'IHU"! i i» nM IN. MMiyhl, 
never reduced to writing, was properly rescinded after defendant's attempted escape); State 
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court's concurrent sentence statement, never 
r • --rinded, and consecutive sentences imposed, following 
presentence evaluation requested by deti/w1,, "M V \ Court stated, in Curry: "fT]he oral 
statement from liii" i\ u.il J e luding defniiltnf'X snili'iiu . writinp„ a 
defendant's sentence was n»* .\4ered until September 7, 1990 HI e,, alter the mnety da> 
evaluation)] . . . — iti.jdi^ :. ^ -
has only been punished once for his offense—under the trial court's final, duly written and 
entered sentence, Therefore, he has no double jeopardy claim. 
liii h in II i i I. .k'tiiifii h li'llii II'I! if. ,i criminal procedural rules. 
Notwithstanding Wright's protestations (Br. of Appellant at 20), rule 22, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 
fonn. That directive is readily apparent from rule which requires the trial court to 
"issue its commitment setta sentence w..» c e n requires the o l i n a delivumg "the 
defendant to confinement iu ucnvci a true c~~v of the commitment to the jail or prison and 
[to] make his return on the commitment and file it with the court, " H—Ur those acts 
2That result, this Court observed, was consistent mthHinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 
481 P.2d 53 (1971), holding that a judgment is not final until entered in written form. Curry, 
814 P.2d at 1151. In Hinkins, the supreme court dismissed the defendant's appeal from an oral 
sentence for contempt of court, holding that no appeal could lie from a non-written order. 
Accord Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) (sentence is final when 
"pronounced and recorded on the docket" (quoting authority)). 
7 
require a written sentence, or commitment: they cannot be performed upon a mere oral 
sentence announcement. 
If needed, further clarification of the requirement that a sentence be entered in 
written form comes from Utah's civil procedure rules, which "also govern in any aspect of 
criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that any 
rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 81(e). Under the civil rules, a judgment must be signed and filed to be valid. Rule 
54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that a civil judgment "includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies." In turn, civil rule 58A(a) through -(c) prescribes that a 
judgment is "entered," and final, only when signed by the trial judge (or court clerk in 
certain instances) and filed. Accord Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53, 54 
(1971) (oral sentence statement is not an appealable order); Newton v. State Road Comm'n, 
23 Utah 2d 350, 463 P.2d 565, 567 (1970) (court's oral statements "are superseded by the 
formal written findings and judgment"); McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah 
1952) ("[N]o antecedent expressions of the judge can in any way restrict his absolute power 
to declare his final conclusion, in the only manner authorized by law, to wit, by filing his 
decision' . . . " (quoting authority)). Thus by operation of civil rule 81(e), a criminal 
judgment has no legal effect until it is signed and filed. In this case, because the trial court's 
initial sentencing announcement was never thus entered in written form, it had no effect.3 
3Several cases from other jurisdictions also support this result. E.g., State v. Mason, 833 
P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Mont. 1992) (rejecting double jeopardy argument of type raised by 
Wright); State v. Rushing, 103 N.M. 344, 706 P.2d 875, 876-77 (N.M. App.) (same), cert, 
denied, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (N.M. 1985). 
8 
The remaining inquiry, as indicated by civil rule 81(e), is whether any 
constitutional provision commands the contrary rule urged by Wright—i.e., that a criminal 
judgment is final upon its mere oral announcement by a trial court. This case presents no 
occasion to fashion such a rule. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987), 
relied upon by Wright (Br. of Appellant at 17-21), compels no such rule. By its terms, 
Villano holds that an orally-announced sentence is final and controlling only as a "settled 
principle offederal criminal law," 816 F.2d at 1450 (emphasis added). The states, of 
course, are not bound to follow federal criminal law in lockstep fashion. And neither Villano 
nor the cases cited therein (cited in Br. of Appellant at 18-20 n.2) opine that states are 
constitutionally compelled to follow the federal "oral sentence controls" rule as a blanket 
matter. In fact, by construing Utah law to hold that a criminal sentence has no effect until it 
is entered in written form, this Court actually avoids the double jeopardy problem raised by 
Wright in this case. Cf. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 (Utah 1989) (state law should 
be construed to avoid constitutional infirmities).4 
To the extent that the federal "oral sentence controls" rule might be 
constitutionally driven, it applies to different procedural facts from those presented in this 
case. The federal rule applies to situations wherein a written criminal sentence, without 
explanation or further hearing, varies from a prior, orally-announced judgment: in such a 
4It is doubtful whether Wright would have a double jeopardy claim even if the trial 
court's oral sentence were considered final. The United States Supreme Court has intimated that 
"multiple punishments" concerns may not apply to noncapital sentencing at all. See Caspari v. 
Bohlen, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 948, 964-55 (1994) (noting the Court's "traditional refusal 
to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing . . ."); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 
37-38 n.6 (1988) (expressly reserving the question). 
9 
situation, the orally-announced sentence controls. As such, the federal "oral sentence 
controls" rule is not grounded in double jeopardy principles. Instead, the federal rule 
enforces the due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard regarding 
sentence. See Villano, 816 F.2d at 1452 ("Sentencing should be conducted with the judge 
and defendant facing one another and not in secret"). 
Due process requirements were honored in this case. Following the initial 
oral, unwritten announcement of Wright's sentence, the trial court learned that the twice-
ordered presentence report was finally forthcoming. At that point the court, properly 
desiring to make a fully-informed sentencing decision, promptly set a new sentencing hearing 
(R. 98-99).5 At that hearing, Wright, having reviewed the presentence report, reargued his 
case for probation rather than state prison incarceration (R. 88-91). That satisfied due 
process. See State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 
1048, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1991). Hence the "oral sentence controls" rule advocated by 
Wright need not, and should not, be applied to this case. 
Despite the Utah rule that no sentence exists until it is properly signed and 
filed, Wright contends that the orally-announced sentence did impose punishment upon him, 
because he began serving that "sentence" immediately after it was announced (Br. of 
Appellant at 24-26). However, the mere fact that Wright remained in jail following the oral 
sentence announcement did not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 
Instead, that jail time was only an extension of confinement that commonly continues 
^Compare United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428, 1434 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (in 
waiting five months to correct written sentence, after defendant had begun to serve it, "[t]he 
district court acted too late"). 
10 
between the time a criminal defendant pleads or is found guilty, and the time of sentencing. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance").6 
Perhaps some remedy is due to a defendant who is confined for an 
unreasonable time after an adjudication of guilt, but before sentencing. Under rule 22(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah criminal defendants have a general (but waivable) 
expectation of sentencing within thirty days after the guilt finding. Wright was confined for 
ninety-eight days between entry of his guilty plea and the trial court's written entry of his 
prison sentence-that is, sixty-eight days longer than rule 22(a) contemplates. 
Under the circumstances, Wright received an appropriate remedy for that 
presentence delay. The mix-up about the presentence report, which caused the initial delay, 
cannot be attributed to the prosecution or to trial court error. After that mix-up was 
corrected, a large portion of the subsequent delay-from 01 August to 29 August 1994-was 
caused by Wright's own request that the trial court consider additional mental health 
information (R. 37, 105-06). Ultimately, the trial court credited all of Wright's presentence 
confinement, plus his pre-guilty plea confinement, against his prison sentence (R. 38). 
Wright needs no further remedy, and double jeopardy law ought not be made more tortuous, 
cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 387 (1989), to create a further remedy for him. 
Similarly, when a ninety-day presentence "diagnostic evaluation" (a more elaborate 
evaluation than occurred in this case) is ordered, the Utah legislature has expressly provided that 
the confinement for such evaluation "does not constitute a commitment to prison," although 
credit for time in such confinement is given. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(2) (1995). 
11 
In sum, under Utah law and the facts of this case, the "oral sentence" that 
Wright would have this Court enforce was really no sentence at all. He was only punished 
once for his offense, when the trial court reconsidered its oral announcement of Wright's 
sentence upon review of the presentence report, and entered, upon due notice and hearing, a 
more stringent final sentence. Wright's double jeopardy argument therefore fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Wright's criminal sentence should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^LL day o f June> 1 9 9 5-
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
L I ^ . 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of 
appellee were hand-delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, to RONALD S. FUJINO and 
VERNICE AH CHING, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, attorneys for defendant-
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than, which ereated the Psychiatric 8ectxrity 
Review Bound, was rtpetltd in 1992. 
Cross-References, — Division and Board of 
Mental Health, I 62A.1M01 at tec. 
Hearing oa mental condition of dtftndant 
£tmd aot guilty ky reason of insanity, 
• 77.16a.302. 
Pardon* and paroles, TUle 77, Chapter 27. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. 
Availability of pita. 
Availability of treatment 





Former Subdivisions (4Xe) and (4Xd) 
unconstitutional bteaus* nons of tbt consider* 
ations tbtrtin wu relevant to tbt traatzntnt 
rationale. Tht application of tbott provisions 
to a mentally ill criminal dtftndant was thus 
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of tht dut 
fuaranttt of Utah Const, Art 1,1 7. 
IU v. Copeland, 766 FJZd 1266 (Utah 1968). 
Availability of pita. 
This rult does not require a dtftndant to as-
sart a dtftnst of not fuilty by rtason of insan* 
ity as a condition precedent to tht availability 
of e/uil£y BJ>6 mentally ill instruction and vtr* 
diet Stata v. Young, 663 fJU 327 (Utah 1993). 
Availability of trtataent 
A finding that traatzntnt is available is rtle* 
vant to a dtcision to commit a criminal defen* 
dant under Subdivision (4). Stats v. Copelsnd, 
765 tM 1266 (Utah 1968X 
Guilty and mentally QL 
Uncontrovtrtod tvidsnet of a dtfendantfs 
mental illneaa in connection with a finding of 
guilty rtquirte a trial Judge to find tht defea* 
4%nt guilty and mtntally 01 and than deter* 
jUne tht appropriate disposition of tht defen-
dant, whether it be to prison or to tht statt 
hospital Sutt v. DtPlonty, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 
1*87). 
-^Length. 
A dtftndant who is found guilty and — 
HUy ill should be givtn s sentence of tbt taint 
^ration as any other dtfendant oonvieUd of
 m 
the same offense. Committing such a defen*" 
**nt to tht state mental hospital dote not in-* 
t**rupt or extend the length of the defendant's 
*otenee. Sutt v. DePionty, 749 FJtd 621 
<lltah 1967). 
•^Plaee. 
Trial court did not err in sentencing defen* 
*tnt to tht Utah Sute Prison instead of tht 
Utah State Hospital, where the court conaicV 
•Nd the testimony of several witnesses and 
"Und that while defendant had established 
Ulat ht had a mental illness as defined by stat* 
**e, he iii not meet the other criteria required 
•fr commitment to the stats hospital. Stata ?. 
Mdsrtoa, 789 P.2d 27 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Anderson, 797 ?2d 416 (Utah 1990). 
A conviction of guilty and mentally 01 dots 
**t ipso facto entitle the defendant to be com-
^ttad to tht stats hospital rathtr than the 
•Kte prison. Whether dsfendant is entitled to 
Ptychiatric treatment as a xnstttr of right is a 
*f*tual issue. Sutt v. Anderson, 797 ?JU 416 
^tah 19901 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigfcaa Young Law Ravfrw. — Convict* 
ing or Confining? Alternative Directions in In* 
sanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally 111 
Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Ac* 
cjuitteea, 1983 B.Y.U. L Rev. 499. 
A.LRi — Pyromsnis and tht criminal law. 
61 AUUth 1243. 
Probation revocation: insanity as defense* 66 
A u u t h mi 
Nonconsensual traatzntnt of involuntarily 
committed mentally ill persons with 
**uroleptie or antipsychotic drugi as violativt 
• state constitutional guaranty, 74 AXJt4th 
»099. 
Instructions in stata criminal east in which 
defendant pleads insanity as to hospital eon* 
fiftement in event of acquittal, 81 AXJUth 
« 9 . 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment a^d commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict
 0f guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court afiaffeel a toe lor imposing senten^
 wMch shaft be not leas than two 
nor more than 30 daya after the verdict t* plea, unleaa the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwiae Ordere, Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continut o r .jjter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shaft afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf taj to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to ahow any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney slutf also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defend^ may be tried in his absence, ht 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence if * defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Cross-Referenoee. — Pieoentence inveeti-
gation, f 764404. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, UJLE. 
Suspending imposition taf aentence and plat* 
ing defendant on probation, I 77-18-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 












—Presence of counsel. 
—Presence of defendant 
—Time. 
——Continuance for defendant 
——Waiver. 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant 
Cited. 
Advising defendant of right to appoaL 
Trial court's failure to again advise defen-
dant of his right to appeal at sentencing was 
harmless error where trial court had informed 
him of such right at the trial and after the 
verdict, and he did not object to the timeliness 
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 P£d 2 
(Utah 1S82). 
Illegal sentence. 
A district court may reassume jurisdiction to 
correct an erroneous and void sentence, irre-
spective of the time limits. State v. Lee Urn, 79 
Utah 68, 7 ?3d 825 (1932). 
Defendant must first ask the trial court to 
correct his sentence if he believes that it has 
been imposed in an illegal manner. State • . 
Brooks, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. S3 (Utah Ct App. 
1994). 
Jurisdiction. 
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court 
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence 
until the sentence has been corrected; however, 
once a court imposes a valid aentence, it loaee 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State 
v. Montoya, 62$ P.2d 676 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
Sentence*. 
—Habitual offenders. 
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine 
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordi-
nance, could not thereafter impose a jail aen-
tence under those provisions of ordinance pro-
viding for cumulative punishment for a second 
or subsequent offense, without taking evidence 
upon the question of the previous conviction. 
Ex parte Mulliner, 101 Utah 51,117 P-2d 819 
(1941). 
—Indefinite suspension of aentence. • 
The court, by indefinitely suspending aen-
tence, and permitting defendant to go on his 
own recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, ao 
that it could not afterwards have him rear-
rested, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah 
838, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. S t R. 853 (1903). 
Sentencing hearing. 
—Continued hearing. 
Failure to advise accused of nature of the 
charge, his plea and the verdict thereon at a 
sentencing proceeding which was a continua-
tion of a prior sentence hearing was not revers-
ible error where defendant was adequately ap-
prised of that information in the initial pro-
ceeding, although it would have been prefera-
ble for defendant to have been advised of those 
facts in the continued proceeding. State v. 
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980). 
—Evidenee. c-
Delinquency record. 
A record of delinquency is not admissible in 
thtguilt phase of a trial even though it u rele-
vant and materiel to the issues, but the limita-
tion goes only to the use of tht delinquency 
record as "evidence* and is not a bar to consid-
eration in the sentencing phase of a criminal 
ease. State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 
1980). 
——Polygraph examination. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to consider at sentencing the results of 
the polygraph examination offered by the de-
fendant, who claimed that the test was perti-
nent to the ultimate question of his guilt, be-
cause the issue of defendant's guilt was already 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, 
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be consid-
ered. 
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a master may 6ubmit a draft 
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their sugges-
tions. 
(D Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the ap-
pointment of any person as a master on the same grounds as a party may 
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. 
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same man-
ner as a motion. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Challenging of jurors 
Rule 53, FJIC.P. for cause, U U C P . 47(f). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Scope of appointment 
A special master who was directed to review 
™P°^* requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the 
—Failure to object. scope of his appointment by investigating and 
——Waiver. reporting on the issue of attorney's fees since 
Scope of appointment. the court had already ordered an award of at-
Status as judicial officer. torney's fees and the parties had no notice that 
_ the master was to review that award nor did 
Report.
 t n e parties have an opportunity to participate 
—.Fniltir* tn nhi*r4_ *n the master's proceedings. Plumb v. State, 
J
 S09 PJ&d 734 (Utah 1990). 
——Waiver.
 g u t u f a g j u d i c i a J o f f i c e 
One who made no objection to masters re-
 A g p e c i a f ffiasUr ^ ^ d u t i e s ^ o b l i g a . 
port as required by this rule could not question
 Um o f t j u d i c i a l oKlceTt ^ ^ AmM n o t 
the report for the first time on appeal from dis-
 e n g a g e m unethical ex parte contacts with the 
trict court order adopting the master's find- judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent 
ings. Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d S67 (Utah to the substance of the referral. Plumb v. State, 
1980). 809 PJ2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity testimony heard by predecessor, 70 AXJtSd 
f § 226,228, 66 Am. Jur. 2d References f i 1 et 1079. 
aeq., 30 et seq. Referee's failure to file report within time 
C.J.S. — 30A C J.S. Equity <f 515, 520,521 specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
to 528,532,533,535,537,539 et seq.; 76 C J.S.
 M terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
References §§ 7 et seq., 60 to 110,122 et aeq. what are "exceptional conditions'' justifying 
A . L R - Bankruptcy, right of creditor who ^f^^ ^fa Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b). 
has not filed timely petition for review of ref- j AX.R Fed 922 
Power of .ooeuot or lubnituUJ n u U r or « < •» « * • B t t o » » » S e t « . . . » 1 0 7 7 , » 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on ***** 
PART vn. 
•JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain, a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any oraer or omer iorm 
which abjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally, Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each aide as 
between or among themselves* 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (dX3) tion to require payment of costs, UJtCP. 
and (dX4), relating to the award of costa by the 40(b). 
appellate court and costs in original proceed* Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costa, 
ingt before the Supreme Court, were repealed | 49-6-S0L 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel. sute , payment of costa awarded against, 
late Procedure, effective January 1,1985. See, | 7S-27.13. 
now, Rule M(«, Utah R£PP*. . Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to UJICP 62(hX 
Rule 58A UTAH BULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 162 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Chad is Oil Shale Corp. •. Larson, 20 Uufc 
U S69, 438 ?M $40 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. Sd. — 22A Am. Jar. 2d Declare- declaratory relief is state court, S3 AUR.4& 
lory Judgment* i l 183, 186, 203 at seq. 146. 
CJ.S. — 26 CJB. Declaratory Judgment! Key Number*. — Declaratory Judgment *• 
l i 17, 18, 104, 1S5. 41, 42, 251, 367. 
A U l — Eight to jury the! in action far 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 64(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue offset and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph Crow-References. — Judgment against 
(d) it intended to remedy the difficulties sug- person dying after verdict or decision, not a 
getted by Thompson r. Ford Motor Co., 14 lien on realty, I 78-22-1.1. 
Uuh 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963). Judgment by confeesion authorised, I 76-22-
Compiler's Notee. — The subject matter of S. 
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a), 
FJLCP. 
Opening default or default judgment dtimed 
ID have been obtained became of attorney'e 
mistake at to time or place of appearance, 
trial or filing of naceeaary papers, 21 AX&£d 
1255. 
Validity and construction of constitution or 
etatute authorizinf exclusion of public in aex 
effenat case*, 39 A.LRSd 652. 
Eifbt of accuaed to have preas or ether Bodia 
repreMDUtivee excluded from criminal thai, 
49 AXAJd 1007. 
Rules 78 to 80. Repealed. 
Bepeal*. — Rule 78, relating to motion day, 
Bull 79, relating to books and record* kept by 
the atari, and Rule 80, relating to reporter! 
Power of court to impoee standard of per* 
ecu*] appearance or attire, 73 ALRSd 353. 
What amounU to "appearance'' under atat-
trte or rule requiring notice, to party who has 
"appeared," of intention to take deleult judg-
ment, 73 AXJL3d 1250. 
Applicability of Judicial immunity to acta of 
clerk of court under etate law, *4 JLUUth 
1186. 
Key Numbers. — Clarke of Courte e» 24,06; 
Court* e» 61 ei eeq.; Judgment e» 276; Motions 
• 67; Trial e* a, 20. 
and record tranacripta, were repealed by eider 
of the Supreme Court, affective May 2* 1WL 
PART XL 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in generaL 
(a) Special statutory proceedinga. These rule* shall apply to til special 
atatutory proceedings, except insofar as auch rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, auch procedure ahall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedinga 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar aa auch 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administra-
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or incon-
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement 
City courte. — Former I 78-4-32, as en* 
acted by L 1977, eh. 77,1 1, transferred the 
jurisdiction and power* of the city court* to the 
municipal department* of the circuit eourta. 
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, aee TV 
tie ?a, Chapter 4. 
Crot*-Reference*. — Administrative Rule* 
msting Act, I 63-46a»l et eeq. 
Circuit eourta generally, I 76-4-1 et aeq. 
Justice court* generally, I 7S-M0I at esq. 
Uniform Probate Coda, Title 75. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings. 
City and justice*' eourta. 
Criminal proceedings. 
Special statutory proceedings. 
Cited. 
Adminiitrative proceedtafa. 
The Utah Hulet of Civil Procedure are inap-
plicable to a proceeding before an administra-
tive body aeeklnf to regulate activities Bur* 
dened with e public interest. Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 2S7 P.2d 670 (1955). 
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor dearly 
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial 
Commission and therefore supplement* the 
procedure of the Commission, Griffith v. Indus-
trial CommX IS Utah 2d 264, S99 PJ2A 204 
(1965). ; 
Where road commission9* order that sign be 
